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90 POHLE v. CHRISTIAN [21 C.2d 
separated from the service and has not been granted his vaca-
tion, he shall be entitled to unused portions of vacation on 
the basis of one and one-quarter days for each. month or 
major portion of a month of service from the first of the 
calendar year until the date of his separation, but not to exceed 
thirty working days." The respondents argue that under sec-
tions359c and 359d of the Political Code, a person who is 
not in the service of the state cannot have a vacation. They 
point to language in these sections declaring that "officers 
and employees of the State of California shall be entitled to 
a vacation. " Since the appellant is no longer .an employee 
of the state, they maintain, he is not entitled to a vacation, 
and section 4 of rule 13, being inconsistent with these code 
provisions, must be held invalid. 
The applicable sections of the Political Code may not rea. 
sonably be so interpreted. They do not expressly or otherwise 
provide that an employee having the right toa vacation loses 
his right to. compensation for that time upon being separated 
from the service. The rule and the code provisions are in com-
plete harmony, and the appellant is entitled to the vacation 
allowance claimed by him unless he waived it by refusing to 
take a vacation before he was laid off. [5] But as the respondents 
did not plead a defense of waiver in their answer, it is not 
now available to them. (Wienlce v. Smith, 179 Cal. 220 [176 
P. 42] ; Wood v. Jotham Bixby 00., 29 Cal.App.2d 294 [84 
P.2d 204] ; Kadow v. Oity of Los Angeles, 31 Cal.App.2d 324 
[87 P.2d 906] ; 25 Cal.Jur. 931.) 
The judgment is reversed with directions to the trial court 
to issue a writ of mandate requiring the payment of the 
amount to which the appellant is entitled as salary for 24% 
days accumulated vacation. 
Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J. 
pro tern., concurred. 
Gibson, C. J., did not participate herein. 
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied November 
27, 1942. Gibson, C. J., did not participate therein. 
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Executions-Title of Purchaser-SubsequentIYA~quired .Title .. 
-Upon execution sale of the interest in real property of one 
of several devisees, th.e purchaser acquires an undividedfrac-
tional interest in the' property. But in case ona subsequent 
partition the devisee's fractional interest in one . parcel is 
transmuted to a sole ownership in another parcel, the put~ 
chaser does not acquire the additional interest in the second 
parcel by virtue of the execution sale alone, as it constitutes 
an after-acquired title. 
Partition-Judgment-Effect.-Because the original grant to 
a cotenant embraces an undivided interest in and title to the 
entire tract or estate, a partition deed' or decree technically 
does not confer upon him a new title or interest .. Yet prac-
tically a new title is created where as the result of partition 
the undivided interest of a cotenant in one parcel is trans-
muted to a sole ownership of another. 
Decedents' Estates-Final Distribution-Collateral Attack.-: 
Inasmuch as a probate court on distribution. has no power to 
pass on the claims of a judgment creditor of Ii. devisee or of' an 
execution purchaser of his interest, it is not· an impeachtben~ 
of a decree of distribution by means of a will for a court of 
equity at the suit of an execution purchaser to determine 
that, notwithstanding a decree distributing sole ownership of 
one tract to a devisee pursuant to a partition although the. 
will devised. two tracts to codevisees as cotenants, the devisee 
was vested with an undivided fracti9nal interest at the time 
of the execution sale. 
ld.-Partition Upon Distribution-Effect: Final Distribution 
- Persons Concluded - Execution Purchaser. - An execution 
purchaser of the undivided fractional interest of a devisee 
loses his interest in the property when by partition the entire 
property is allocated to persons other than the judgment 
debtor. And a decree of distribution disposing of the prop-
[1] See 11 Ca1.Jur. 117; 21 Am.Jur. 140. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Executions, § 96(1, 4); [2] Parti-
tions, § 59; [3] Decedents' Estates, § 1061; [4] Decedents' Estates, 
§§ 1055, 1079; [5] Execution, §§ 81, 96(1); [6, 7] Decedents' Es-














92 NOBLE v. BEACH [21 C.2d 
erty in accordance with the partition decree also concludes 
the rights of the purchaser in the property. 
[5] Executions-Title of Purchaser-Redemption-Effect.-Where 
on partition by a probate court a devisee's undivided frac-
tional interest in two properties is transmuted into sole own-
ership of one, a purchaser on prior execution sales of the 
devisee's interest in both parcels acquires the interest in the 
property allocated to the devisee. A grantee of the devisee 
acquires merely the debtor's equity of redemption, and by 
paying the sum bid at one sale, he redeems only the undi-
vided fractional interest sold at such sale. 
[6] Decedents' Estates-Final Distribution-Persons Concluded.-
Inasmuch as the rights of a jUdgment lien creditor or execu-
tion purchaser in a devisee's share of a decedent's estate can-
not be determined in a probate court, a decree of distribution 
awarding property without mentioning their claims is not 
res judicata and does not preclude them from urging their 
claims in a separate suit. The filing of a written request for 
or a waiver of notices of estate proceedings does not confer 
on the court power to adjudicate such claims, and the failure 
to assert their rights at the time of distribution cannot con-
stitute the basis of an estoppel or claim of laches. 
[7] ld.-Final Distribution-Matters Determined.-A decree of 
distribution awarding money and stock, representing a lega-
tee's share of estate personalty, to the debtor and providing 
for delivery to a sheriff pursuant to an executbn does not 
determine any rights or claims of a jUdgment creditor. And 
the creditor's acceptance thereof does not estop him from 
claiming any right against the real property of the estate. 
[8] Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Finding-Conflict. 
'-Judgment for defendant must be reversed where a finding 
of the truth of the allegations of the cross-complaint and 
affirmative. defenses pleaded is not supported by the facts 
pleaded. This is true even if the finding be regarded as one 
of ultimate fact based on findings of probative facts which do 
not support the judgment. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Ala-
meda County. John D; Murphey, Judge. Affirmed in part 
and reversed in part. 
Action for declaratory relief to secure an adjudication of 
rights in certain properties. Judgment quieting title in cer-
tain defendants affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
Booth B. Goodman and Lionel B. Benas for Appellants. 
Frank J. Fontes for Respondents. 
-------~~~--~--~--------'---
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TRAYNOR, J.-In 1934, appellants obtained a judgment 
against Milton J. Wiren in Alameda OOUnty, an.d there re-
corded an abstract of the judgment. In 1935,. the judgment 
debtor's mother, Amanda W. Wiren, died testat~ and by her 
will devised a parcel of real property situated in AlalIleda 
County and a parcel situated in San Francisco Oounty to re": 
spondents Milton J. Wiren, Mildred Tellier, and Ruth A.' Wil. 
Iiams in equal undivided shares. Appellants then recorded 
fin abstract of their judgment in San FranciscO County and 
levied execution upon the debtor's interest in the San Fran-
cisco property. In 1936, orie of the devisees filed a petition' 
in the estate proceedings to partition the real property. There-
after, appellants levied execution on Wiren's interest in the 
Alameda real property, and at sheriff sales in Alameda and 
San Francisco counties they purchased his interest in the 
Alameda property for $700 and his interest in the San Fran-
cisco property for $750. Following the execution sales, an 
order for partition was entered by the probate court in the 
estate of Amanda W. Wiren whereby the Alameda property 
was allocated to Milton J. Wiren in sole owriership, and 'the 
San Francisco property was aII.ocated to the other deVlsEles. 
Wiren then sold his interest in the Alameda. property .to.re· 
spondentFrank Beach, who purported to redeem' that par-
cel from the execution sale by paying to app~Ilantsthe ~um 
of $700 plus interest and penalties. A decree of final distti. 
bution in the estate. of Amanda W. Wiren wllssubsequentIy 
entered by the probate court, 6:rdedngdistributibil.Of'tlte 
Alameda County property to Frank Beach .. as 'a~signee. ;0'£ 
Milton J. Wiren, and distribution of the San Fra:ncisco Comity 
. property to Mildred Tellier and Ruth A. Wiliiams. 
Appellants· brought this action for declaratory' relief to 
secure an adjUdication of their rights .• in· the Alamedaarld 
San Francisco real property. At the commencemen.t of the 
action, a balance of $4,619.49 remained tinpaidon. theirjudg-
ment, arid they claimed ownership of either an undivided 
two-thirds interest in the Alameda property or'an uttdivided 
one-third' interest in the San Francisco property .. ·. As' an 
alternative, appellants contended thateither~Ii undivided 
two-thirds interest in the Alameda pro'perty wassuhject t~ 
the lien of their judgment or that they had a lien: on an un-
divided one-third interest in the San Francisco property. From 
a judgment determining that appellantsbave no. lbterestJ in 
either parcel and quieting the' title of certai:ri respondents to 














94 NOBLE v. BEACH [21 C.2d 
[1] The main issue is the nature and extent of the inter-
est in the Alameda County property acquired by appellants 
as purchasers at the execution sale held in that county. It is 
well settled that the estate of a decedent vests, subject to ad-
ministration, in his heirs or devisees and legatees immediately 
upon his death (Schade v. Stewart, 205 Cal. 658 [272P. 567] ; 
Estate of YQrba, 176 Cal. 166 [167 P. 854]; Prob. Code, §§ 
28 and 300), and a devise given to more than one person gen-
erally vests in them as. owners in common. (Prob. Code, § 29.) 
Before distribution, a creditor may obtain a judgment lien on 
the interest of his debtor as heir or devisee and legatee of an 
estate (McGee v. Allen, 7 Ca1.2d 468 [60 P.2d 1026] ; Martin.;. 
ovich v. Marisciano, 137 Cal. 354 [70 P. 459]), and he may 
execute upon the debtor's interest at that time. (McGee v. 
Allen, supra; Estate of Lind, 1 Ca1.2d 291 [34P.2d 486] ; 
Code Civ. Proc., §688.) Upon a sheriff's sale of real prop-
erty the purchaser is "substituted to and acquires all the right, 
title, interest, and claim of the judgment debtor" thereto at 
the date of the levy or sale. (Code Civ. Proc., § 700.) A sale 
by the sheriff has the same force and effect as a conveyance by 
the judgment debtor in the form of a quitclaim deed at. the 
date of the sale (Freelon v. Adrian, 161 Cal. 13 [118 P. 220] ; 
Frink v. Roe, 70 Cal. 296 [11 P. 820] ; Kenyon v. Quinn, 41 
Cal. 325; Estate of Pierce, 28 Cal.App.2d 8 [81 P.2d 1037], 
and it does not operate to convey any after-acquired title or 
interest of the judgment debtor. (Rupertv. Jones, 119 Cal. 
111 [51 P. 26] ; Frink v. Roe, supra; Emerson v. Sansome, 
41 Cal. 552.) From these established principles it follows 
that title to an undivided one-third interest in the Alameda 
and San Francisco property immediately vested in Milton J. 
Wiren upon the death of Amanda W. Wiren. By recording 
abstracts of their judgment, appellants obtained a lien on 
Wiren's interest as devisee, and as purchasers at the execu-
tion sales they acquired the interest that Wiren then had in 
the parcels of realty, representing an undivided one-third in-
terest in the Alameda property and a similar interest in the 
San Francisco property. As a result of the subsequent parti-
tion, Wiren's undivided one-third interest in the San Fran-
cisco property was transmuted into an undivided· two·thirds 
interest in the Alameda property. Appellants did not acquire 
this additional interest in the Alameda property allotted to 
Wiren on partition by virtue of the Alameda execution sale 
alone, for it constituted an "after-acquired" title or interest 
that does not inure to the benefit of the purchaser. 
---~~~~~--------' 
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[2] Respondents seek to avoid thisconcl~i<)~by'$e .argU~ 
mElUt that: inasmuch as a: partition deeq. 'or' ,decree does'l1ot 
create or convey any new or additional t~t1~! o~intere~tthe 
undivided two-thirds interest in the., Alameda. propertY-Was 
not. "after~acquired" property wIthin'tM. ,rule. '. ': Theo]:,()ad' 
doctrine that partition does. not· create or'. conveyartew:i:>:r' , 
additional title or interest but merely severs the Uliityofpos-
session is widely accepted and variou!i!lykipplied~'T (Erstat!'!;'f' 
Putnam, 219 Cal. 608 [28 P.2d27]j 'Rose, 'Ii., Me~1ner,l42 Cal. 
322 [75P.905]; Lloyd v; Davis,.123 O~L 348 [55'P; 10031"; 
Wadev. Doray, 50Ca!. 376; Potr.erqNui'3v'O Ldfl,fll ~(;o.,'\t.'4tl 
Persons, 29 CaLApp. 743[156 P; 876];see'l'iff,~'ny; R'ealPrdp~ 
erty, 3d ed., vol. 2, 470.) Thefollowipgrules are' ~ften., de-
scribed as resulting from an applieation of thedo~trine: One 
who has a mortgage upon an undivided iriterestacqu:ireshpon 
partition a mortgage on· the portion' allocated' in severalty to 
the mort~agor (Betts v. Ward,196 Ala. 248[1~'S0.1101; 
Baltzell v. ])aniel, 111 Fla. 303[149 So. 639, ,93A.L:.R. i259]; • 
Webb v.Rowe, 35 Mich: 58; see Lloyd v. Davis, 'supra.) 'UpOh 
partition of property held, in cotenancy the lienexistiIig on 
an undivided interest attaches solely to ,the land allotted to 
the cotenant against whose interE~st the, lien was a charge 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 769; see Freeman, Cotenancy and Pa~i­
tion, 415), and a cotenant who undertakes tocollvey his inter-
est in a particular portion of a gener~l tract and subsequently 
receives such portion .on partition is estopped from asserting 
title thereto against his grantee. (East, Shore, Co.v. Rich. 
mond Belt Ry., 172 Cal. 174 [1,55 P. 999]; Emeric v. Al-
varado, 90Ca!. 444. [27 P. 356] ; Wadev.Derdy, $upra.) Con. 
siderations of policy must, however, detef)lline the applica~ 
tion of the doctrine (see Baltzell v. Daniel, supra; Loomi~ .v. 
Riley, 24 Ill. 307). It will not be meclianicallyapplied to 
confer upon the execution sale purchaser of a cotltenaht's 
undivided interest in specific property any additional inter-
est in that property subsequently allotted the foriner ower 
on partition in place of his undivided interest inanother par-
cel. Because the original grant to 'a cotenant embraces an 
undivided iiiterest in and title to the entire trllct or estate, a 
partition deed or decree technically does not confer lip on him. 
a new title or interest. Practically it does, howeyer, as, the 
present case illustrates, for before the partition Wirel1 could 
convey only an undivided one-third interest in the Alameda 
property, but thereafter he was able to convey the entire prop· 
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erty. He had the power to make that conveyance because he 
acquired by partition that which he did not previously have. 
(See Tiffany, Real Property, 3d ed., vol. 2, p. 470.) 
13] Respondents also contend that the decree of distribu-
tion vested the sole ownership of the Alameda property in 
Milton J.Wiren upon the death of his mother, and a court of 
equity cannot hold that only an undivided one-third interest 
in the property was vested in him at the date of the sale 
witllOut overstepping its bounds and attempting to impeach 
the decree of distribution by means of the will. That argu-
Ulent is dispelled, how~ver, by the fact that the probate court 
has no power, (in distribution, to pass on the rights and claims 
of a judgment lien creditor of the devisee (McGee v. Allen, 
Supra; Martinovich v. Marisciano, supra) or an execution pur-
chaser or assignee of the devisee's interest. (McGee v. Allen, 
supra; Kingsbury v. Ross, 217 Cal. 484 [19 P.2d 784J ; Cooley 
v. Miller &7 Lux, 156 .Cal. 510 [105 P. 981J ; Estate of Crooks, 
125 Cal. 459 [58 P. 89J; Estate of Burton, 93 Cal. 459, 461 
[29 P. 36]; Chever v. Ching Hong Poy, 82 Cal. 68 [22 P. 
1081].) Those claims may be asserted in a collateral suit, and 
it would be unfair to the debtor to hold that he lost by the 
execution sale not only his then interest in the specific prop-
erty sold but also any additional interest in that property 
thereafter allotted to him on partition in place of his un-
divided interest in other property merely because the Probate 
Code (§ § 1100 et seq.) makes provision for partition before 
distribution and states that an allotment made therein shall 
control upon proceedings for distribution. (§ 1106.) 
[4] The next inquiry concerns the interest acquired by 
appellants asputchasers at the San Francisco execution sale. 
Before partition, Wirenhad an undivided. one-third interest 
in the San Francisco property, and as a cotenant he held 
that interest subject to the contingency of its loss if on sub-
sequent partition that parcel were allocated to one of his co-
tenants. (East Shore Co. v. Richmond Belt Ry., supra; Emeric 
v. Alvarado, supra.) Appellants, as purchasers at the execu-
tion sale, acquired Wiren's interest in the property subject 
to that contingency (East Shore Co. v. Richmond. Belt Ry., 
supra; Emericv. Alvarado, supra), and when by partition 
the entire San Francisco property was allocated to Mildred 
Tellier and l~uth A.Willia:rns, appellants lost their interest in 
that property. 'rhr decree of distribution disposing of the 
property in accordance with the terms of the partition decree 
-~. -. --.~-,-------~ 
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also concluqed appellants' rights therein. (William }lill Co. v. 
Lawler, 116 Cal. 359 [48 P. 323]; Estate of Lux, 149 Cal. 200 
[85 P. 147].) . ' 
[5] Before partition, however, appellants were sub~ituted 
to the claims of the debtor and they acquired' Wiren'sentire' 
interest in the'San Francisco property. That, inter~st· neces- . 
sarily included the right to have an additionalintere,st in the' 
Alameda land allocated to him by the probat¢ court, in the 
event the court made such an allocation, in lieu of his u.n-
divided interest in the San Francisco land. If on partition 
Wiren had been allotted a fractional interest iri. . severalty 
in the San Francisco property, that interest would have inure~ 
to the benefit of appellants (East Shore Co. v. Richmond Belt 
Ry., supra,· Emeric v. Alvarado, supra; Wade v. Deray, 
supra), and the same result should follow when by partition 
Wiren's undivided interest therein was transferred to adif-
ferent parcel. If appellants had merely a lien on Wiren's 
interest in the San Francisco property, they woUld pe en-
titled to look to the property assigned to their debtor in the 
partition proceedings under section 769 of the Code ofCivit 
Procedure which reads: "When a lien is on an undivided 
interest or estate of any of the parties, such lien,if a partition 
be made, shall thenceforth be a charge only on the share 
assigned to such party .... " The diligent creditor who causes 
the debtor's interest to he sold on execution and purchases 
that interest should be in no less favorable position, alid sec-
tion 766 provides that "if ... any of the cotenants has con-
veyed to another person his interest . . . such conveyance, 
whatever its form, shall be deemed to have passed to the gran-
tee any lands which, after its execution, may have been set 
aside to the grantor in severalty ... ." This after-acquired 
interest of the debtor represented, and was dependent upon, 
his previous interest sold on execution (see. Wade v.' Deray; 
supra), and the San Francisco execution sale and the Alameda 
execution sale are readily distinguishable on this basis. Since 
the devisee's entire interest in the two parcels of realty com~ 
prising the estate of the testatrix was sold'be£ore distribution 
at successive execution sales, the purchaser who took subje~t 
to administration also took the interest in the real property 
thereafter allocated to the devisee in the partition proceeding. 
It follows that respondent Beach, as Wiren's grantee, ac-
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paying to appellants the sum bid at the Alameda County exe· 
cution sale, he redeemed only an undivided one-third interest 
in the Alameda property. Appellants remained owners, sub-
ject to redemption, of an undivided two-thirds interest in the 
property. 
[6] The special defenses interposed by respondents. are not 
supported in the facts. Respondents contend that the decree 
of distribution awarding the property to respondents without 
mention of the claims 'or interest of appellants therein is res 
judicata as to their rights, and that by their failure to 
assert their rights at the time of distribution,.appellants are 
guilty of laches and .are estopped from claiming an interest 
in the property. There is no provision in the Probate Code, 
however, for determining the rights of a judgment liencredi-
tor or execution purchaser in the devisee's share of a de" 
cedent's estate. (McGee v. Allen, supra; Martinovichv. Maris-
ciano, supra.) A judgment creditor or grantee of a devisee 
may urge his claims in a separate suit. (McGee v.Allen, 
supra; Kingsbury v. Ross, supra; 11lartinovich v. Marisciano, 
supra; Cooley v, Miller &; Lux, supra; Estate of Crooks, supra; 
Estate of Burton,supra; Chever v. Ching Hong Poy, supra.) 
Since the probate court was without power to pass upon the 
claims of a creditor or grantee of the devisee, the filing of a 
written request for, and waiver of, notices in the estate pro-
ceedingsby appellants did not confer that power upon the 
court. Similarly, the fl'dlure of appellants to assert their rights 
at the time of distribution cannot constitute the basis for an 
estoppel or make appellants guilty of laches. [7] The decree 
of distribution awarding the sum of $508.12 and certain shares 
of stock,representing Wiren's share of personalty in the 
estate, to the debtor and providing for delivery to the sheriff 
pursuant to appellants' execution did not determine any 
rights or' claims of the judgment creditor. It merely recognized 
the procedure set forth in section 561 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, which is designed to protect the creditor in what-
ever rights he may have. It follows that the acceptance by 
appellants of the benefit of that portion of the decree did 
not estop them from asserting their rights against the real 
property. 
[8] Respondents rely upon the fact that this appeal is 
taken on the judgment roll alone, and that the present inquiry 
is therefore limited to a consideration of whether the findirws 
s'upport the judgment. (Ward v. Ward, 15 CaL2d 234, 236 
Oct. 1942] NOBLE v. BEACH [21 C.2d 911 
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[100 P.2d 773] ; Gin S. Chow v. City of Santa Barbara, 217 
Cal. 673 [22P.2d5] ; Hollywood Cleaning &; P. 00: v. Holly-
wood Laundry Service, 217 Cal. 124 [17 P.2d 709].) They 
contend that the findings of res judicata,. estoppel, 'd.rid. 
laches support the judgment. With respect to these special 
defenses the trial court found that all the allegations of the 
cross-complaintS and all the affirmative defEllisesi:tlterposed 
by respondents are true and supported by the evidence: . This 
finding can only be construed as a legal \lonclusio'Jiand a 
finding that the factual matters alleged in support 'of ,such 
defenses are true. The facts alleged, even if accepted, ,do not 
support the defenses, and even if the finding be deemed one 
of ultimate fact, a reversal of the judgment is Ilonetheless 
required, for the case is brought within ther1l1e',that'iwhere 
it clearly appears that the ultimate fact found is based upon 
and adduced· from the findings of probative facts,' and it is 
plain that the latter do not justify orsuppOl't the ultimate 
fact found, the findings of probative facts will'c~ntror . . . 
and so deprive the judgment of support." (Geer.v. Sibley, 
83 Cal. 1 [23 P. 220] ; Lamanet v. Lamanet, 18 Cal.App.2d 
402 [63 P.2d 1195] ; Whitney v. Redfern, 41Cal.App.2d 409 
[106 P.2d 919].) The trial court's alleged finding of theulti-
mate fact that respondent Beach was and is the owner of the 
Alameda property and that appellants have no right, title, 
interest, or claim in or to said property clearly falls within 
this rule. 
That part of the judgment quieting the title of respondent 
Mildred Tellier to the San Francisco property is affirmed; 
that part of the judgment quieting the title .of respondent 
Frank Beach to the Alameda County property and decreeing 
that appellants have no interest therein is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., and 
Schauer, J. pro tem., concurred. 
." 
